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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4:03-cr-00121-001) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on April 24, 2020 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 




BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
When nothing has changed since a defendant’s original sentencing, a court does not 
abuse its discretion by sticking with its initial sentence. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
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In 2004, Gilbert Robinson pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell 50 or more grams of crack 
cocaine. In his plea agreement, Robinson and the Government agreed to recommend that 
the District Court compute his Sentencing Guidelines range based on 35.7 grams. Consid-
ering the stipulated drug quantity and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
court sentenced Robinson to the bottom of his Guidelines range: 292 months’ imprison-
ment followed by eight years’ supervised release. 
The First Step Act of 2018 later authorized federal judges to resentence defendants with 
drug convictions if another law had raised the drug quantities needed to trigger certain 
minimum and maximum sentences. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. 
That other law, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, had raised the amount of crack cocaine 
required to trigger one statutory sentencing range from 5 to 28 grams and another from 50 
to 280 grams. Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (amending 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B) (iii)). 
Robinson moved for resentencing under the First Step Act. But the District Court found 
him ineligible for relief because the drug quantities specified in his indictment and plea 
agreement still exceeded the new, 28-gram threshold and triggered the same statutory pen-
alty. The District Court also noted that even if Robinson were eligible for relief, it would 
have exercised its discretion to impose the same sentence because his Guidelines range 
would be the same. 
Robinson now timely appeals this denial. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). We review the District Court’s legal determinations de novo. United States v. 
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Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2012). We review its decision to deny the motion for a 
reduced sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
We need not decide whether the District Court erred in finding Robinson ineligible for 
relief. The court concluded that, in any event, it would have applied the same Guidelines 
range at resentencing. Because the drug quantity charged in the indictment (at least 50 
grams) and the quantity stipulated in the plea agreement (35.7 grams) both exceeded the 
Fair Sentencing Act’s 28-gram threshold, his statutory sentencing range stayed the same 
under 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). So did his career-offender status under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1. Thus, the same ten-year mandatory minimum, life maximum, and Guidelines 
range of 292 to 325 months still apply. And his 292-month sentence is still at the bottom 
of the range. 
Robinson moved to reduce his sentence because he thought that the Fair Sentencing 
Act had reduced his statutory sentencing range. But it did not. And he pointed to nothing 
else that had changed since his original sentencing. So the District Court did not err in 
declining to reconsider the other § 3553(a) factors. 
Finally, Robinson argues that the District Court should have considered his 
postsentencing conduct as proof of rehabilitation under Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 
476, 490 (2011). Though Pepper held that a defendant’s postsentencing conduct “may be 
highly relevant to several § 3553(a) factors,” it also held that courts need not consider this 
at resentencing. Id. at 491, 504–05. In any case, Robinson failed to present any evidence 
of his good behavior in prison for the District Court to consider. Thus, the court did not 
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abuse its discretion in denying his motion for resentencing and sticking with its initial sen-
tence. We will affirm. 
